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THE ASSURANCE OF FAITH 
Nicholas Wolterstorff 
In this paper I discuss an issue concerning how faith ought to be held. 
Traditionally there have been those who contended that faith should be held 
with full certainty, with great firmness. John Calvin is an example. John 
Locke offered both epistemological and pragmatic considerations in favor of 
the view that faith should be held with distinctly less than maximal firmness. 
He proposed a Principle of Proportionality. I assess the tenability of Locke's 
proposal-while also suggesting that Calvin's position is different from what 
on first reading it would appear to be. It is not straightforwardly in conflict 
with Locke's position. 
The Hebrew and Christian scriptures praise and enjoin what they (in English 
translations) call faith. That has led persons in the communities which take 
these scriptures as authoritative to call and struggle for faith. It has led 
theologians and philosophers to inquire into the nature of faith, and to offer 
suggestions as to how faith ought to be held, or can best be held. 
Proposals as to the nature of faith, and suggestions as to the proper or best 
manner of holding it, have focussed for the most part on four issues: 
(1) Of what genus is faith a species? Is it a species of believing propositions 
on sayso? Is it a species of loyalty to some person or cause? Is it a species 
of trusting someone? Is it a species of believing what someone has promised? 
Is it a species of 'concern'? Is it a species of knowledge? if so, of what sort: 
agnitio (recognition, acknowledgement), cognitio, or what? 
(2) What is the intentional content of faith? Iffaith is believing propositions 
on sayso, whose sayso and which propositions? If faith is a species of loyalty, 
loyalty to whom and concerning what? And so forth. 
(3) What, if anything, entitles a person to have faith? Why is faith not 
unwise, or irresponsible? Or is it one or the other of these? 
(4) What is the proper way of holding faith? If faith is 'concern,' must it 
be 'ultimate' to be faith? Or should it be 'ultimate' even if it can be faith 
without being 'ultimate'? If faith is trust, ought it to be unquestioning and 
unwavering; or would it be better if it were? And so forth. 
The question I wish to discuss falls under this fourth heading. There are 
those who have argued-I have John Locke and his associates especially in 
mind-that Christians ought to hold their faith with a firmness distinctly less 
than that, say, with which most of us assent to the proposition that 2x3=6. 
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Others have apparently denied this. Of these, some have apparently not just 
rejected Locke's normative suggestion but suggested an alternative; viz., that 
faith ought to be held with maximal firmness. It is this dispute which I wish 
to enter. I shall do so by bringing part of the philosophical tradition, in the 
person of John Locke, into dialogue with part of the theological tradition, in 
the person of John Calvin. I choose Locke because I know of no one who 
has more articulately presented the case for tempered firmness than he did; 
I choose Calvin because I know of no theologian who has discussed the issue 
with more theological acumen and human sensitivity. 
I 
The question, "What is the nature of (Christian) faith?" is, in my judgment, 
ill-formed. Both in the Scriptures and in the Christian tradition this single 
word "faith" is used to pick out a number of somewhat different phenomena. 
Each of those has its own 'nature.' There is no 'nature' of all together. If the 
discussion which follows is not to be "void for vagueness" we shall have to 
make a selection. 
How shall we do that? I suggest that there is no better way of doing it than 
to be guided by that passage of Scripture which treats of faith at greatest 
length and most directly; viz., the well-known eleventh chapter of Hebrews. 
The writer opens the chapter with a crisp definition of faith and then proceeds 
to offer a series of brief narratives concerning heroes of faith, these narratives 
interspersed with amplifications on the opening definition. In the following 
two chapters he goes on to discuss the sorts of actions which faith calls forth, 
how one is to understand and endure the sufferings which faith so regularly 
causes, and the role of Jesus in faith. Allowing this classical discussion of 
faith to guide us in our choice will save us from idiosyncrasy; an additional 
advantage, as it turns out, is that the phenomenon which the writer of Hebrews 
calls faith is also that on which Calvin had his eye when he discussed faith. 
Faith, says the writer, is the hypostasis of things hoped for, the elenchos 
of things not seen. In older translations, hypostasis and elenchos were trans-
lated, literally and straightforwardly, as "substance" and "evidence" respec-
tively. In the newer RSV the translation runs, "the assurance of things hoped 
for, the conviction of things not seen." It must be granted that "hypostasis" 
and "elenchos" are used eccentrically here; "assurance" and "conviction," 
however, seem less than satisfactory translations. But since nothing in my 
discussion will hang on what precisely is meant by "hypostasis" and "ele-
nchos" here, and since I have no better suggestion of my own to make, I will 
adopt the RSV translation. 
Having given his definition of "faith," to which he adds immediately that 
"by it the men [and women] of old received divine approval," the writer of 
Hebrews proceeds to cite examples. His first example falls under the heading 
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of conviction of things not seen but not under that of assurance of things 
hoped for: "By faith we understand that the world was created by the word 
of God, so that what is seen was made out of things which do not appear." 
All the examples which follow, however, are examples of both. I think we 
must conclude that paradigmatic examples of faith are specimens not only of 
conviction of things not seen but of assurance of things hoped for. 
Paradigmatic examples of faith are thus oriented not toward eternity but 
toward what happens. More specifically, they are oriented toward the future. 
More specifically yet, they are the conviction that something good will come 
about, not something bad. Faith is the assurance of things hoped for, not of 
things indifferent, let alone of things dreaded. The conviction of Californians 
that a serious earthquake will occur there sometime in the near future is not 
an example of faith. Faith has to do with the conviction that history has a 
certain pattern, a certain 'grain; to it. It has to do with the conviction that 
what happens will overall prove good for one, and for others as well. 
Is Christian (and Jewish) faith then simply optimism? Suppose that because 
of one's supposed discovery of certain laws of nature and society one is 
optimistic about one's own destiny and that of human beings in general. 
Would that be faith? Was Karl Marx a man of faith? No. As the writer 
proceeds, he begins to speak repeatedly of promises, of God's promises. "By 
faith [Abraham] sojourned in the land of promise." "By faith Sarah herself 
received power to conceive, even when she was past the age, since she 
considered him faithful who had promised." "By faith, Abraham, when he 
was tested, offered up Isaac, and he who had received the promises was ready 
to offer up his own son." "These all died in faith, not having received what 
was promised ...... "And all these, though well attested by their faith, did not 
receive what was promised ...... 
In faith, that which one hopes for is that which God promised. One hopes 
for it because one trusts God's promises. Indeed, one couldn't trust God's 
promise without hoping for what is promised. We can say, I think, that as the 
writer of Hebrews understands it, Christian faith, in its paradigmatic form, is 
a species of believing or trusting someone's promises, specifically, God's 
promises. God's promises to bless, to save. 
"Aren't you leaping to unwarranted conclusions?" someone might object. 
Granted that trusting God's promises is central in the discussion of faith 
offered by the writer of Hebrews. How do you know that the writer would 
not, if the question were put to him, insist that faith is actually the more 
general phenomenon of trusting God? Trusting God's promises-i.e., trusting 
God with respect to God's promises-is indeed faith. But so too is trusting 
God with respect to God's warnings. And trusting God with respect to what 
God reveals about himself. This last comes close to the traditional medieval 
concept of faith, according to which faith was understood as the appropriate 
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human counterpart to God's revelation: Faith is believing propositions on 
God's sayso. Perhaps both that, and what Hebrews focuses on, should be 
thought of as special types of the more general phenomenon of trusting God, 
this more general phenomenon being faith. 
Perhaps so. All the main points to be made in what follows could be made 
in terms of that more general concept. I shall, however, follow the emphasis 
of the writer of Hebrews in the examples he gives of faith, if not indeed in 
his very understanding of faith, by taking faith to be trusting God's promises 
to bless and save. I do so in part to counteract what seems to me the persistent 
tendency in the Christian tradition to allow this phenomenon of trusting God's 
promises to recede from attention in discussions on faith, replaced by almost 
exclusive attention on trusting God with respect to what God says about 
himself. When that happens, the 'heroism' of the heroes of faith is no longer 
understood. Faith is a little child putting its hand in the hand of the parent, 
trusting the parent's promise. 
Faith, understood as trusting God's promises to bless, presupposes believ-
ing that God has promised to bless and believing that God has (or will at the 
appropriate time have) the power and the will to carry out what God has 
promised. (Perhaps the reason the writer of Hebrews cites, as his first example 
of faith, belief in creation by the word of God, is that he wishes to remind 
the reader of God's power.) Thus for the secularist, and for the adherents of 
many religions other than Judaism and Christianity, faith is not even an 
option. Faith is not some universally human phenomenon. It cannot occur 
outside a certain framework of conviction. And for most human beings, that 
framework of conviction is absent. Naturally there can and will be other 
things in their lives which would, in English, be called "faith." 
May it be that trusting God's promises to bless just is believing the prop-
ositions that God has promised to bless, and that God has (or will have) the 
power and will to implement the promise? I think not. One might believe that 
someone has promised to do something, and that the person has (or will have) 
the power and will to do what he promised, without in any way placing one's 
confidence in those promises. They might be, or be treated as, irrelevant to 
oneself. Trusting God's promises includes such placing of confidence. It is 
my impression that there is no set of propositions such that trusting God's 
promise is identical with believing those propositions. But we must move on; 
it would distract us from our main purpose to probe further into the nature 
of the general phenomenon of trusting someone's promise to do X, or even 
into the specific phenomenon of trusting God's promise to bring about sha-
lom, well-being, flourishing. l 
John Calvin, in his discussion of faith, insisted repeatedly that Christian 
faith is the conviction that God is good to one based on one's trust in God's 
promise to one. Now though one could in principle believe that God is good 
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to one without basing that conviction on one's acceptance of God's promises, 
one could scarcely trust God's promise to bring one some good without being 
convinced that God is good to one (in at least that respect). Accordingly, I 
think we will be entirely faithful to Calvin's thought if we describe him as 
holding that Christian faith (in its paradigmatic form) is trusting the promises 
of God toward one. Let me quote some of the relevant passages: "In under-
standing faith it is not merely a question of knowing that God exists, but 
also-and this especially-of knowing what is his will toward us" [Institutes 
III, ii, 6].2 This we discern by listening to God's Word. Thus there "is a 
permanent relationship between faith and the Word" [ibid.]. Faith is "a knowl-
edge of God's will toward us, perceived from his Word" [ibid.]' 
But since man's heart is not aroused to faith at every word of God, we must 
find out ... what, strictly speaking, faith looks to in the Word. God's word to 
Adam was, 'You shall surely die.' God's word to Cain was, 'The blood of 
your brother cries out to me from the earth'. But these words are so far from 
being capable of establishing faith that they can of themselves do nothing 
but shake it .... Where our conscience sees only indignation and vengeance, 
how can it fail to tremble and to be afraid? or to shun the God whom it dreads? 
Yet faith ought to seek God, not to shun him. 
It is plain, then, that we do not yet have a full definition of faith, inasmuch 
as merely to know something of God's will is not to be accounted faith. But 
what if we were to substitute his benevolence or his mercy in place of his 
will ... ? Thus, surely, we shall more closely approach the nature of faith; for 
it is after we have learned that our salvation rests with God that we are 
attracted to seek him .... we need the promise of grace, which can testify to 
us that the Father is merciful... [III, ii, 7]. [So] we shall possess a right 
definition of faith if we call it a firm and certain knowledge of God's benev-
olence toward us, founded upon the truth of the freely given promise in 
Christ. .. [ibid.]. 
[We] make the freely given promise of God the foundation of faith because 
upon it faith properly rests. Faith is certain that God is true in all things 
whether he command or forbid, whether he promise or threaten; and it also 
obediently receives his commandments, observes his prohibitions, heeds his 
threats. Nevertheless, faith properly begins with the promise, rests in it, and 
ends in it. For in God faith seeks life ... [III, ii, 29]. 
John Locke's account of faith was different, more traditional. Faith, says 
Locke, is believing what God has revealed, provided one believes it on the 
ground that it has been revealed by God and provided one believes that, in 
turn, on the credit of someone who claims that it was revealed to him (or 
someone else) by God. Faith is thus a unique species of believing something 
on sayso, of believing something on authority. In Locke's own words, "Faith 
is the assent to any proposition, not made out by the deductions of Reason; 
but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God in some extraordi-
nary way of communication" [Essay IV, xviii, 2].3 
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Clearly what Locke singles out as faith is different from what Calvin and 
the writer of Hebrews single out. Accordingly, when Calvin and Locke speak 
about the manner in which a person should hold to faith, they are not speaking 
about the same thing and disagreeing, or apparently disagreeing, only about 
the proper manner of holding it. They are speaking about different things, 
different ways of being. Locke is speaking about believing propositions, on 
the credit of some proposer, as coming from God. Calvin is speaking about 
trusting God's promises. Nonetheless there can be no doubt that what Locke 
says about the way we should hold to faith, as he understands faith, he would 
also say, mutatis mutandis, about holding to faith as Calvin understands it. 
Perhaps Locke would adapt his thesis to Calvin's understanding of faith by 
arguing that trusting some promise of God to do something presupposes 
believing the proposition that God has promised that, and the proposition that 
God has the power and retains the will to carry it out; and then contending 
that one or both of those propositions ought to be believed with less than 
maximal confidence. 
II 
Faith, Calvin insists, is "a firm and certain knowledge of God's benevo-
lence toward us" [III, ii, 7], "a sure persuasion" of it [III, ii, 12], "a sure 
confidence in divine benevolence and salvation" [III, ii, 15]. Calvin explains 
his insistence thus: "We add the words 'sure' and 'firm' in order to express 
a more solid constancy of persuasion. For, as faith is not content with a 
doubtful and changeable opinion, so is it not content with an obscure and 
confused conception but requires full and fixed certainty, such as men are 
wont to have from things experienced and proved" [III, ii, 15]. In short, "we 
teach," says Calvin, "that faith ought to be certain and assured ... " [III, ii, 
17]. 
One of Locke's reasons for arguing that faith ought to be held with less 
than maximal firmness was consequentialist. He and his associates were 
convinced that only if believers did not hold their faith with maximal firmness 
was there any hope for toleration in a society characterized by religious 
diversity. But that was not Locke's only reason; nor, it would appear, the one 
to which he himself gave most weight. Locke's insistence that Christian 
believers should not hold their faith with maximal firmness was a straight-
forward consequence of his general epistemology-coupled, of course, with 
his understanding of faith. I wish, in some detail, to consider Locke's epis-
temological argument; that done, to look briefly at his appeal to social con-
sequences. 
The focus of Locke's concern in the latter part of Book IV of his Essay 
was on what might be called regulative, as distinguished from analytic, epis-
temology. That is to say, Locke was concerned to offer, in Descartes' phrase, 
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"rules for the direction of the mind," or in his own phrase, rules for "the 
conduct of the understanding." Fundamental to Locke's regulative epistemol-
ogy was the distinction between belief and firmness of belief. Locke thought 
that one could hold the same belief with differing degrees of firmness-and 
different beliefs with the same degree of firmness. 
What did Locke have in mind by firmness of belief? In recent years there 
has been much talk about levels of confidence in propositions-with betting 
situations often proposed as tests of such. Might Locke, by "firmness of 
belief," have meant levels of confidence? 
I think not. In any case, one would hope not; for the two notions are distinct 
in an important way. One cannot believe p with a certain firmness without 
believing p; one can, though, have a certain level of confidence in p without 
believing p. If one believes p very firmly one will not, except through inad-
vertence, believe not-p at all. One will, though, have a certain level of con-
fidence in not-p-namely, a low level. So too, while fully aware of p, one 
might believe neither p nor not-p; in that situation one will, though, have a 
certain level of confidence in both. Thus the array of a person's degrees of 
firmness of belief will not satisfy the Pascalian calculus of probabilities. It's 
not true, in general, that the firmness with which one believes p varies in-
versely with the firmness with which one believes not-po Whether the phe-
nomenon of levels of confidence satisfies or should satisfy the Pascalian 
calculus remains, from what we have said, an open question. 
It is worth remarking that having a certain level of confidence in p is also 
not to be equated with being more or less certain of p, nor with finding p 
more or less credible (belief-worthy). One might find both p and not-p low 
in credibility, as one might be very uncertain of both of them. Thus it's not 
the case that as the credibility or certainty of p goes up, that of not-p goes 
down (and vice versa). The complementational principle for negation neither 
holds nor could hold for either of these phenomena. 
The thought naturally comes to mind that to believe p with such-and-such 
firmness is just to have such-and-such a level of confidence in p and to 
believe p. There is no evidence that Locke himself actually thought of firm-
ness of belief like this; nonetheless, I judge that he would have been happy 
to embrace this way of thinking if it had been put to him. I myself judge that 
the notion of firmness of belief is ambiguous as between this notion, of 
believing with a certain level of confidence, and another notion. Later, when 
we return to Calvin I shall call attention to that other notion and thus disam-
biguate the notion of firmness of belief. In the meanwhile, let us construe 
firmness along the line suggested. 
Might it be a mistake, though, to think of believing a proposition as one 
thing, and having a level of confidence in a proposition as another thing? 
Might it be that believing p just is having a level of confidence in p above a 
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certain threshold? Does our customary trichotomy of believing/withhold-
ing/disbelieving simply pick out broad gamuts on the continuum of levels of 
confidence? Is talk about levels of confidence to be seen as the invitation to 
pick out narrower gamuts-or even, points-on the same continuum? 
I rather doubt it; since it appears to me that one might have the same level 
of confidence in two different propositions while believing one and not be-
lieving the other. But I shall discuss the issues without presupposing an 
answer. It's worth noting, however, that even if belief is identical with levels 
of confidence above a certain threshold, a regulative epistemology of degrees 
of confidence does not automatically constitute a regulative epistemology of 
belief. For the regulative epistemology of degrees of confidence might tell 
us only that degrees of confidence are to be matched with degrees of some-
thing else; and from that we might not be able to infer how much of this 
something else, in absolute terms, is necessary for one to be entitled to a 
degree of confidence which is a case of belief-even if we knew where the 
line demarcating belief from non-belief fell. 
Parenthetically, did Locke hold the assimilationist thesis, that believing p 
consists of having a level of confidence in p above a certain threshold? I think 
not. At least he speaks as if he did not. For example, he sometimes speaks as 
if he believed that though belief just flows over us in certain situations, in 
those same situations we can, presumably by act of will, regulate the firmness 
of our belief-regulate the level of confidence in the proposition believed. 
He says, for example, that "the grounds of probability, ... as they are the 
foundations on which our assent is built; so are they also the measure whereby 
its several degrees are, or ought to be regulated" [IV, xvi, 1]. But if Locke 
held the assimilationist thesis, this would be a most surprising thing to say: 
that one's ability to regulate the degree of confidence one has in some prop-
osition has this limitation on it-one cannot regulate it across the belief 
threshold, only within the space which lies on either side of the threshold. In 
any case, the central regulative rule of Locke's epistemology is a rule for the 
regulation of degrees of confidence and not a rule for the regulation of belief. 
The rule is this: One ought never, for any proposition, to adopt a level of 
confidence in it which is not proportioned to its probability on one's total 
evidence for it. 
Four comments must be made about this principle of proportionality, two 
explanatory and two qualifying. First, there will, of course, be propositions 
toward which one adopts no level of confidence whatsoever; in particular, 
propositions of which one has never so much as thought. Of these, there may 
be some toward which one ought to adopt some level of confidence. But if 
so, the principle of proportionality has nothing to say about that. 
Second, to understand Locke's intent we must take note of an ambiguity 
in the notion of proportioning levels of confidence to probability on evidence. 
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One might mean by this that if the probability of p on one's total evidence 
is greater than the probability of q on one's total evidence, then one's level 
of confidence in p is to be greater than one's level of confidence in q. Such 
a principle would not tell one how much confidence to place in either p or 
q. Of course, if the probability of 0 on total evidence is even higher than is 
that of p, then, if the principle is to be satisfied, one's level of confidence in 
p must not be maximal; similarly, if some proposition has even less going 
for it than q does, then, if the principle is to be satisfied, one's level of 
confidence in q must not be minimal. But I see no apriori reason for thinking 
that, whatever be one's level of confidence in p, it might not have been 
slightly higher or slightly lower while yet the totality of one's levels of 
confidence satisfy the principle. The case will turn on whether there are no 
no more discriminable degrees of probability on evidence than there are 
discriminable levels of confidence. The other way of understanding the notion 
of proportionality is this: One might assume that between levels of confidence 
and certain degrees of probability on evidence there is an inherent aptness 
(fittingness, rightness, propriety); and one might hold that one's task is to see 
to it that one's level of confidence in some proposition fits its probability on 
total evidence. 
I know of no passage in which Locke distinguishes these interpretations 
and chooses between them. Nonetheless a good deal of what he says suggests 
quite clearly that it is the latter interpretation that he has in mind. Accord-
ingly, that is how I shall interpret the principle. (Either way, the principle is 
for the regulating of degrees of confidence and not for the regulating of 
degrees of belief. It is totally silent on when it is permitted for one to believe 
p; alternatively, it is totally silent on when the 'fit' degree of confidence is 
above the belief threshold.) 
And now for the qualifications. Locke was not of the view that we do hold, 
nor of the view that we ought to hold, all our beliefs on evidence-i.e., on 
the basis of other beliefs of ours. Some of our believings are immediate, 
non-inferential. And to some of those we are entitled. But if I am entitled to 
believe some proposition immediately, I am not obligated to proportion the 
firmness of my belief to its probability on any evidence whatsoever. Thus 
the principle is to be interpreted as having this prefatory qualification: With 
the exception of those propositions which one is entitled to believe immedi-
ately .... 
Secondly, suppose one's total evidence is very poor, but that the proposi-
tion in question is highly probable on that evidence. The principle as it stands 
instructs one to believe the proposition with great firmness. But that seems 
thoroughly implausible. Locke himself never discusses the matter. But it 
seems obvious that we have to attach this qualification: provided one's total 
evidence is satisfactory. One can think of one's total evidence for a proposi-
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tion as being satisfactory in case it entitles one to adopt a certain level of 
confidence in it. Of course, even when one's evidence for p is extremely poor, 
one might still be entitled to adopt some definite level of confidence in 
p-namely, a level in the region of .5. But in such a case it's not the evidence 
which confers the entitlement. 
What level of confidence ought one to place in propositions for which one 
does not have satisfactory evidence? Here various answers are possible. One 
might say that the notion of a right or wrong level of confidence does not 
apply in such cases. Or one might say, implausibly, that to all such proposi-
tions one ought to adopt the minimal level of confidence; or, almost as 
implausibly, a .5 level of confidence. The most plausible answer would seem 
to be that one is entitled to whatever level of confidence one happens to have 
in the proposition. 
Whatever one's answer, it would be plausible to suppose that in some cases 
there is another and prior obligation-namely, the obligation to acquire sat-
isfactory evidence. Locke himself was clearly of the view, however, that by 
no means is there always such a prior obligation. Acquiring satisfactory 
evidence typically takes time and energy; and sometimes spending the time 
and energy would require one to neglect other, more weighty, obligations. It 
may be added that responsibly assessing the probability of a proposition on 
satisfactory evidence may also take time and energy which one ought to 
devote to carrying out more weighty obligations. Thus the Principle of Pro-
portionality should be seen as specifying a prima facie, not an ultima facie, 
obligation. 
The qualification just made obviously constitutes an escape hatch for the 
religious believer: If one's total evidence for one's faith is not satisfactory, 
then the Principle of Proportionality does not apply; or if it is satisfactory, 
but responsible weighing of probability on that evidence would take one away 
from more weighty obligations, then the application of the Principle to the 
case is superseded. Locke was of the view, however, that religious convic-
tions are so important that no obligations could be so weighty as to prohibit 
one from taking the time, at least on "the sabbath," to acquire satisfactory 
evidence and to responsibly weigh probability on that evidence. It is far from 
obvious that this is true. Thus there may be a good many religious beliefs of 
a good many people for which the principle's application is superseded or to 
which it does not apply-even when its inapplicability does not represent a 
violation of prior responsibility to acquire satisfactory evidence. But I shall 
here not press the point. 
To show that the Principle of Proportionality holds for faith, Locke must 
also show that no one is entitled to hold faith immediately. To simplify my 
exposition of this part of Locke's argument, let me now neglect the compli-
cations introduced by the fact that epistemic obligations do not always su-
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persede all other obligations. Locke was of the view that one is entitled to 
accept some proposition immediately only if the acceptance accompanies, or 
is evoked by, one's 'seeing' the proposition to be true or remembering that 
one has done so. He was further of the view that 'seeing' or remembering 
'seeing' some propositions to be true constitutes knowledge. Knowledge is 
not a species of belief. Locke himself explains belief as taking some propo-
sition to be true without 'seeing' or remembering 'seeing' it to be true. But 
suppose we regiment our terminology a bit (more) and define "acceptance" 
as taking some proposition to be true whether or not one 'sees' or remembers 
'seeing' it to be true. Then believing, as Locke understands it, is a species of 
acceptance; and Locke was of the view that if we 'see' or remember 'seeing' 
some proposition to be true, we will also accept it. (The 'seeing' or remem-
bering 'seeing' are not to be identified with the accepting.) Locke assumed 
that the firmness of acceptance which accompanies 'seeing' or remembering 
'seeing' cannot be, or need not be, regulated. At least he never speaks about 
the need to regulate it. And he assumed that the level of confidence is always 
so high that one is certain of the proposition. Furthermore, though he held 
that we place a higher degree of confidence in some of the things of which 
we are certain than in others, he held that the maximal degree of confidence 
one can place in a proposition is that which we do place in those necessary 
truths which are self-evident for us and in those contingent propositions 
which are incorrigible reports of our own states of mind-and in the propo-
sition that we ourselves exist. 
Recall, then, that something is an item of faith, on Locke's view, if one 
believes it on the ground that God has revealed it. Locke held that the hypo-
thetical proposition, if God has revealed p then p is true, can be 'seen' to be 
true. He also held, though, that for no proposition p can one just 'see' that 
God has revealed p. And he held that in general (unless more weighty non-
epistemic considerations intrude) the only way to secure entitlement to be-
lieving some proposition and adopting some definite degree of confidence in 
it, apart from 'seeing' or remembering 'seeing' it to be true, is to believe it 
on satisfactory evidence. Further, his classical foundational ism led him to 
hold that a necessary condition of evidence being satisfactory is that it consist 
of propositions that one 'sees' or remembers having 'seen' to be true. The 
evidence in the case before us will have to be evidence concerning the credit 
of the proposer. But that evidence will never entail that God has revealed p. 
The proposition that God has revealed p will always have a probability of 
less than 1.0 on satisfactory evidence. And from this Locke concluded that 
p itself will have a probability of less than 1.0 on total evidence. 
Locke is mistaken about central points in this argument. I take one of 
Thomas Reid's signal contributions to western philosophy to have been his 
calling to our attention that we are all entitled to a multiplicity of immediate 
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beliefs which we do not 'see' or remember having 'seen' to be true: percep-
tual beliefs, believing what people tell us, etc. And I take the discussion of 
recent years concerning "Reformed epistemology" to have shown that per-
sons are also sometimes entitled to immediate beliefs about God which they 
do not 'see' to be true. Perhaps, then, some of us are sometimes entitled to 
believe immediately that God has revealed so-and-so. In short, it is vastly 
more difficult to know when and where Locke's Principle of Proportionality 
applies than he ever thought it was. 
Fundamental though such issues are, however, I want on this occasion to 
set them off to the side and, without presupposing any particular position on 
what may be believed immediately and when and by whom, address Locke's 
central claim, that unless one is entitled to believe p immediately, one ought 
to proportion one's level of confidence in p to the probability of p on one's 
total evidence, provided that evidence is satisfactory. We believe propositions 
with more or less firmness, i.e., with higher or lower levels of confidence. 
Locke was persuaded that this feature of our mental life ought to be regulated. 
How? By reference, he said, to the probability of the proposition in question 
on one's total relevant evidence, provided that is satisfactory. One's level of 
confidence ought to fit the probability. 
Is this rule of governance correct?4 We can begin by asking, Why did Locke 
think it was correct? Locke's defense occurs in the following passage, a 
passage in which he blends together a defense of the thesis that levels of 
confidence ought to be governed, with a defense of his proposed rule for 
governance, namely, his Principle of Proportionality: 
There are very few lovers of truth for truths sake .... How a man may know 
whether he be so in earnest is worth inquiry: and I think there is this one 
unerring mark of it, viz., the not entertaining any proposition with greater 
assurance than the proofs it is built upon will warrant. Whoever goes beyond 
this measure of assent, 'tis plain receives not truth in the love of it; loves not 
truth for truths sake, but for some other bye end. For the evidence that any 
proposition is true (except such as are self-evident), lying only in the proofs 
a man has of it, whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the degrees 
of that evidence, 'tis plain all that surplusage of assurance is owing to some 
other affection, and not to the love of truth: It being as impossible, that the 
love of truth should carry my assent above the evidence, that there is to me, 
that it is true, as that the love of truth should make me assent to any propo-
sition, for the sake of that evidence, which it has not, that it is true: which is 
in effect to love it as a truth, because it is possible or probable that it may 
not be true [IV, xix, 1]. 
I fail to see any cogency in this argument. Locke seems to take it as obvious 
that love of truth will lead one to try to bring it about that one's level of 
confidence in a proposition fits the strength of the evidence for it. Accord-
ingly, he remarks that any divergence from such fit must be due to a love of 
something other than truth. But what is it that Locke is here taking love of 
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truth to be? He doesn't say. The only attractive way I know of for thinking 
of love of truth, and aversion to falsehood, is along the following lines: If 
one loves truth and is averse to falsehood with equal intensity, and has no 
other loves and aversions which inhibit or distort that love and aversion, then, 
for any proposition which comes within one's ken, one will do what one can, 
given one's other obligations, to bring it about that one believes it if and only 
if it is true. If, per adventure, one should succeed in that endeavor, then one's 
love of truth and aversion to falsehood would have been requited. But notice 
that it would have been requited no matter how much or how little confidence 
one places in what one believes. Thus, understanding love of truth along these 
lines gives no support at all to Locke's principle. 
But if one believes some proposition with a level of confidence higher than 
what fits its probability on one's evidence, wouldn't that have the conse-
quence that one would tend to disregard whatever negative evidence might 
be forthcoming in the future? And that would certainly impair satisfying one's 
love of truth, would it not? Why would it be thought that that is true? Probably 
Bertrand Russell at one time believed very firmly that there is a set of all 
sets. But that didn't impede him from treating the paradoxes he discovered 
as strong evidence against the proposition. 
Let us then turn our attention in the opposite direction: Is there anything 
to be said against the Principle of Proportionality? Notice, in the first place, 
that though a given proposition may be equally probable on two different 
bodies of satisfactory evidence, one of those bodies of evidence may be 
considerably better than the other. What should be thought of as the deter-
minant of better here? Surely one candidate is reliability: One body of evi-
dence for a proposition is better than anothe" ""dy of evidence for that 
proposition in case it is a more reliable indicator of its truth or falsehood. 
When reliability is thought of as determining the quality of evidence, then 
satisfactory evidence, as we explained it, can be thought of as that sort of 
evidence which is minimally reliable for conferring epistemic entitlement. 
But whatever be settled on as the determinant of quality, surely if levels of 
confidence are to be determined by evidence at all, they should be determined 
by quality of evidence as well as probability on evidence. If two bodies of 
evidence are both entirely in favor of All S is P-nothing negative turns up 
in either-but the one is more reliable than the other, then surely the more 
reliable entitles the person to a higher level of confidence. Or, to take one of 
Hume's examples, if two bodies of evidence both point to the conclusion that, 
on average, 19 out of every 20 ships which sail from this harbor return, but 
the one body of evidence is considerably more ample than the other, then 
surely it entitles one to a higher level of confidence in the proposition that, 
on average, 19 out of every 20 ships which sail from this harbor return. 
Suppose then that we introduce the notion of the strength of evidence for a 
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proposition, and think of it as determined by some sort of function from the 
quality of the evidence and the probability of the proposition on the evidence. 
Then if levels of confidence ought to be so regulated as to fit gradations of 
some feature of evidence, it is much more plausible to suppose the feature is 
strength of evidence than either probability on evidence or quality of evidence 
by itself. 
But even with this significant modification, the principle remains thor-
oughly implausible. For notice that levels of confidence are to be regulated 
by an entirely objective feature of evidence. We are to regulate our level of 
confidence in p by reference to what is in fact the strength of one's total 
evidence for p. But now suppose that though the strength of evidence for p 
is high, I believe, after as careful a reflection as you wish to demand, that it 
is weak. I believe that its quality is low, perhaps because I believe it is 
unrepresentative, the negative evidence which there is not yet having turned 
up; or I believe that the proposition's probability on this evidence is rather 
low. Alternatively, suppose that I don't have any beliefs on one or the other 
of these matters; I feel totally incapable of appraising the quality of the 
evidence or I am baffled by how probable the proposition is on this evidence. 
The principle entails that in such situations I am entitled to place a high level 
of confidence in the proposition. But surely that is mistaken. If there is 
obligation in the region here at all, I should give to p a middling level of 
confidence, probably withholding belief. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, 
if the evidence is weak but I believe, on careful and responsible reflection, 
that it is strong. 
The point is that the principle treats our beliefs about the strength of 
evidence for some proposition as having nothing to do with our proper level 
of confidence in the proposition. That is no more true here than it is in 
general. The obligations of medical practitioners are to be determined in the 
light of what they believe and should believe about the causes and cures of 
diseases, not in the light simply of the objective causes and cures. When in 
the course of constructing regulative epistemology one offers a rule for the 
regulation of some aspect of our beliefs, that rule will have to give appropriate 
standing to our beliefs about the criterial phenomena and not simply to the 
criterial phenomena themselves. 
However, a subjectivist counterpart to the objectivist rule we have been 
considering suggests itself at once: One ought never, for any proposition to 
adopt a level of confidence in it which is not proportioned to what on re:o.pon-
sible reflection one believes to be the strength of one's total evidence for it. 
When the limitations on the scope of application which were attached to the 
objectivist principle are attached to this subjectivist variant, does it then 
specify one of our epistemic obligations? 
Assume that quality of evidence is to be determined by reliability. And 
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suppose that upon careful reflection one believes that one's total evidence 
for some proposition is highly reliable and that the proposition is highly 
probable on that evidence. The principle instructs one then to place a high 
level of confidence in the proposition. But there is something strange about 
this injunction applied to this situation. Could one do otherwise? Could one, 
believing that the evidence is highly reliable and believing that the proposi-
tion is highly probable on the evidence, nonetheless adopt a low level of 
confidence in that proposition? If one did in fact adopt a low level of confi-
dence in it, would that not indicate that one did not really believe that the 
proposition was highly probable on the evidence? 
I have made no attempt, in the course of my discussion here, to analyze 
the phenomenon of levels of confidence. In keeping with that inhibition, I 
shall offer no suggestion as to what accounts for the connection here. In 
general, of course, adopting a certain level of confidence in a proposition is 
not identical with believing that the strength of one's total evidence for it is 
of that level-since, for one thing, one might adopt a high level of confidence 
in a proposition for which one has no evidence at all. So the connection is 
not identity. Any analysis of the phenomenon of levels of confidence should 
set as one of its goals to explain and illuminate what the connection is. 
But if the subjectivized version, specified above, of Locke's Principle of 
Proportionality is unavoidably satisfied, then of course it doesn't specify an 
obligation. The truth in the region is at best a descriptive law of some sort. 
Correspondingly, if there is indeed error involved when someone places a 
high level of confidence in some item of faith held on evidence, the error, 
pace Locke, is not to be located in the person's failure properly to regulate 
his or her firmness of belief but rather in the person's having mistaken beliefs 
about the strength of his or her evidence. The error will lie in the person 
having gotten his or her beliefs about the evidence wrong, not in having failed 
to get the right match between firmness of belief and strength (or believed 
strength) of evidence. 
III 
But if Locke's position has turned to dust in our hands, does not Calvin's 
claim also become at the very least deeply problematic, that Christians are 
obligated to trust the promises of God with that high level of confidence that 
they are accustomed "to have from things experienced and proved"? If that 
were what Calvin held, Yes indeed. But that is not what Calvin held. Admit-
tedly he used words which, by themselves and out of context, suggest that to 
us. But he did not hold that. Indeed, so far as I can tell, Calvin did not 
propound nor intend to propound any rule whatsoever concerning the level 
of confidence that Christians ought to place in the promises of God. He held 
that a high level of confidence is desirable, something to be wished and hoped 
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for; since, for one thing, such a confidence "renders the conscience calm and 
peaceful before God's judgment. Without it the conscience must be harried 
by disturbing alarm, and almost tom to pieces; unless perhaps, forgetting God 
and self, it for the moment sleeps" [III, ii, 16]. But though firm confidence 
is desirable for the sake of peace of mind, Calvin did not hold that it is 
obligatory. 
Having just said that "he alone is truly a believer who [is] convinced by a 
firm conviction that God is a kindly and well-disposed Father toward him ... " 
[ibid.], Calvin proceeds to say the following: 
Still, someone will say: "Believers experience something far different: In 
recognizing the grace of God toward themselves they are not only tried by 
disquiet, which often comes upon them, but they are repeatedly shaken by 
gravest terrors. For so violent are the temptations that trouble their minds as 
not to seem quite compatible with that certainty of faith." Accordingly, we 
shall have to solve this difficulty if we wish the above-stated doctrine to 
stand. Surely, while we teach that faith ought to be certain and assured, we 
cannot imagine any certainty that is not tinged with doubt, or any assurance 
that is not assailed by some anxiety. On the other hand, we say that believers 
are in perpetual conflict with their own unbelief. Far, indeed, are we from 
putting their conscience in any peaceful repose, undisturbed by any tumult 
at all. [III, ii, 17] 
How does Calvin solve, or try to solve, "this difficulty"? In part by arguing 
that the Christian self, here on earth, is a divided self: 
In order to understand this, it is necessary to return to that division of flesh 
and spirit which we have mentioned elsewhere. It most clearly reveals itself 
at this point. Therefore the godly heart feels in itself a division because it is 
partly imbued with sweetness from its recognition of the divine goodness, 
partly grieves in bitterness from an awareness of its calamity; partly rests 
upon the promise of the gospel, partly trembles at the evidence of its own 
iniquity; partly rejoices at the expectation of life, partly shudders at death. 
This variation arises from imperfection of faith, since in the course of the 
present life it never goes so well with us that we are wholly cured of the 
disease of unbelief and entirely filled and possessed by faith. Hence arise 
those conflicts; when unbelief, which reposes in the remains of the flesh, 
rises up to attack the faith that has been inwardly conceived [III, ii, 18]. 
How can this be, someone asks. How "can fear and faith dwell in the same 
mind?" In the same way, says Calvin, that "sluggishness and fear so dwell" 
[III, ii, 23]. The phenomenon of the divided self is familiar to all. 
It will have been noted that Calvin spoke about imperfect faith. Imperfect 
faith is faith which does not fill the whole self, faith which does not squeeze 
out doubt and anxiety and fear and "the disease of unbelief." What Calvin 
does not say is that imperfect faith is faith of less than maximal firmness. 
After all, the difficulty he wanted to solve was how faith can be subject to 
doubt while yet being certain. 
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Is Calvin's solution, or apparent solution, to the difficulty at all plausible; 
or is he engaged in verbal subterfuge? Can one be highly confident of some-
thing and yet have some doubts about it-some negative considerations to 
which one concedes at least some weight? Similarly, can one, as Calvin 
claims, be anxious about what the future holds and yet be sluggish-that is, 
not do what promises to avert that which one fears? 
I am not persuaded that such states of mind are not possible. But rather 
than exploring the matter, I wish to suggest that we still do not have Calvin's 
thought fully in hand. Earlier I suggested that the notion of firmness of belief 
is ambiguous. By saying of someone that she believes something firmly one 
may mean that she believes it with a high level of confidence. But may one 
not also mean that she believes it tenaciously, steadfastly, perseveringly? 
Perhaps to believe it thus is to believe it and to be reluctant to give it up, to 
resist giving it up. It seems to me that these two phenomena are indeed 
distinct-that of believing something with a high level of confidence, and 
that of believing something tenaciously. One might tenaciously believe some-
thing in which one does not have a very high level of confidence; and one 
might be not at all tenacious in believing something in which one does have 
a high level of confidence. 
I do not contend that Calvin himself explicitly made this distinction; in that 
regard, he was like most other writers on matters epistemological. I suggest 
rather that he operated with the distinction. It is striking how often the lan-
guage he uses is the language of tenacity rather than that of levels of confi-
dence. I think that the most plausible account of what he was driving at is 
that Christians are obligated to hold the faith tenaciously, with steadfastness, 
with perseverance. Holding it with high confidence is indeed desirable for 
the peace of mind which that brings. But doubts assail us; we can do nothing 
about that. What we can do is be tenacious in our holding of the faith. Here 
is what Calvin says in one place: 
the godly mind, however strange the ways in which it is vexed and troubled, 
finally surmounts all difficulties, and never allows itself to be deprived of 
assurance of divine mercy. Rather, all the contentions that try and weary it 
result in the certainty of this assurance. A proof of this is that while the saints 
seem to be very greatly pressed by God's vengeance, yet they lay their com-
paints before him; and when it seems that they will not at all be heard, they 
nonetheless call upon him. What point would there be in crying out to him if 
they hoped for no solace from him? Indeed, it would never enter their minds 
to call upon him if they did not believe that he had prepared help for them. 
Thus the disciples whom Christ rebuked for the smallness of their faith com-
plained that they were perishing, and yet were imploring his help [III, ii, 21]. 
Clearly it is the tenacity of faith of which Calvin is here speaking. In fact, 
he himself speaks of believers as called to persevere in their struggle against 
unbelief [III, ii, 17], and as called to steadfastness [III, ii, 22]. 
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What can and should we do so as to hang on to our faith in God's goodness 
amidst the doubts that assail us-to endure, to persevere, to remain steadfast? 
It is striking that Calvin does not say that we should put the doubts out of 
mind, ignore them. His language suggests that he thinks the doubts cannot 
be stifled. What he says instead is that the believer should remind herself of 
the promises of God, turning to the Word of God where the promises are 
proclaimed. In addition to the phenomena of believing with varying levels of 
confidence and believing with varying degrees of tenacity, there is the phe-
nomenon of believing with more or less intensity; i.e., keeping some believed 
proposition more or less clearly in mind, closer to the center, focussed-on 
more or less intensely. To endure in one's trust in the goodness of God, it 
helps to keep God's promises in the foreground of one's consciousness, says 
Calvin: 
To bear these attacks faith arms and fortifies itself with the Word of the Lord. 
And when any sort of temptation assails us-suggesting that God is our 
enemy because he is unfavorable toward us-faith, on the other hand, replies 
that while he afflicts us he is also merciful because his chastisement arises 
out of love rather than wrath. When one is striken by the thought that God 
is Avenger of iniquities, faith sets over against this the fact that his pardon 
is ready for alI iniquities whenever the sinner betakes himself to the Lord's 
mercy. Thus the godly mind, however strange the ways in which it is vexed 
and troubled, finaIly surmounts all difficulties, and never allows itself to be 
deprived of assurance of divine mercy [III, ii, 21].5 
IV 
The book of Job is the great biblical book on the topic of the endurance of 
faith. The recitation by the writer of Hebrews of the sufferings endured by 
the heroes of faith-they "suffered mocking and scourging, and even chains 
and imprisonment. They were stoned, they were sawn in two, they were killed 
with the sword; they went about in skins of sheep and goats, destitute, af-
flicted, ill-treated ... wandering over deserts and mountains, and in dens and 
caves of the earth." -this recitation invites from the believer the question: 
But what do I myself do if, in the face of suffering, my trust in the promises 
of God threatens to slip away? It is to this question that the book of Job can 
be read as giving (part of) an answer. (Hebrews 12 also gives part of an 
answer.) The question to which Calvin addressed himself in the passages I 
have cited was closely related, yet different: What do I do when my life is 
painful and I begin to wonder whether God is truly well-disposed toward me? 
Remind yourself of the promises of God. Yes, but what do I do if, when 
having the promises fully in mind, I find trust in them slipping away from 
me because of the darkness of my existence? 
Introspect, said Job's three friends, Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar; uncover 
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your sins, and repent. What is happening to you is to be interpreted as God's 
punishment. 
I refuse to accept that, said Job. Nothing I have done calls for this suffering. 
Though God slay me, yet will I defend my ways to his face [Job 13: 15]. 
It was Elihu who suggested the answer which Job embraced. Though pos-
sibly the evidence we have in hand appears, on balance, to be against the 
trust-worthiness of God's promises, we have so limited a glimpse of human 
destiny as a whole that our total evidence concerning the trustworthiness of 
God's promise is not even minimally satisfactory. One's present life may 
look dark indeed. But that is not satisfactory evidence against God's having 
the will and power to carry out his promise to save one. And further, as to 
power: Remember who God is. God is the one who made all this! 
Job endured in the faith-with what level of confidence, we are not told. 
By doing so, he "pleased God" [Hebrews 11:5]. 
Of course we in the modern world wonder whether there is any God who 
has promised anything. To have doubts about that is to have doubts as to 
whether faith, as Job, Hebrews, and Calvin understood it, is even an option. 
To such doubts, something different must be said. 
v 
To tell someone that they ought to persevere in the faith, come what may-
is that not to encourage the evil of intolerance in societies where there are 
others who do not share the faith? We come at last to Locke's pragmatic 
argument for the thesis that Christians ought to hold their faith with distinctly 
less than maximal firmness. 
In the light of our discussion, let us distinguish, as Locke did not, between 
the claim that holding the faith with a high degree of confidence encourages 
intolerance, when there are others about who disagree with one; and the claim 
that attempting to persevere in the faith encourages intolerance. And let us 
distinguish between social and personal intolerance, understanding social 
intolerance to consist of the view that others ought to enjoy full civil rights 
only if they accept one's own faith, and personal intolerance to consist of 
being unwilling to listen attentively to, and take seriously, objections posed 
by others (or indeed oneself) to one's faith. 
There would seem to be no particular connection between social intolerance 
and either holding the faith confidently or perseveringly. There are, after all, 
plenty of Christian believers who are confidently and perseveringly con-
vinced of the importance of equal civil rights in a religiously diverse society. 
Social tolerance or intolerance has to do with the content of one's beliefs, 
not one's mode of holding them. 
There would also seem to be no particular connection between personal 
intolerance and holding the faith confidently. One can hold mathematical or 
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logical propositions with great confidence and yet be quite willing to listen 
to those who contend that certain sets of such yield paradoxes. Is there any 
reason to think it is different for religious beliefs? 
We are left, then, with the claim that a resolution to persevere in one's faith 
encourages-or perhaps just is-personal intolerance. Is it not a condition of 
authentic dialogue that on the issues discussed both parties have an "open 
mind"? Is it not the case that to be "a true believer" is perforce not to take 
seriously what is said in objection to one's beliefs? There can be no doubt 
whatsoever that the resolution to persevere in one's trust or beliefs does often 
yield personal intolerance. Often a fundamental part of a person's strategy 
for persevering is refusing to attend to objections. 
The question to consider, though, is whether this is necessarily so. Is the 
resolution to persevere in the faith inherently incompatible with personal 
tolerance, or is it rather certain strategies for persevering which are incom-
patible? Quite clearly it is the latter. There are ways of carrying out one's 
resolve to persevere in one's beliefs and trusts which are fully compatible 
with taking objections seriously. Some, indeed, require taking objections 
seriously. There are philosophers of all stripes who are examples of this-
though there are also philosophers of all stripes who are examples of not 
taking objections seriously. Actually, Calvin gives the impression of believ-
ing that believers have no option but to listen to objections, since they do not 
just come from without but arise spontaneously in the heart of the believer. 
One thing the believer might do is that which Calvin and the writer(s) of 
Job recommended: listen to the objections but keep the whole picture in mind 
by reminding oneself of God's promises and of God's power, and of the fact 
that we have but a glimpse of the full pattern of God's dealings with human-
ity-to which I would add, reminding oneself of the signs of God's goodness. 
Secondly, the persevering believer, rather than merely counterbalancing 
objections with considerations drawn from the full picture, or contending that 
we do not yet have anything near the full picture, might try to answer the 
objections. Instead of accepting them at face-value, as providing negative 
evidence, and then looking around for counterbalancing positive evidence, 
the believer might seek to show that the objections don't come to much, that 
they don't in fact provide much of any negative evidence to be put in the 
balance. The believer might either seek to defeat the objections by showing 
that their conclusions are mistaken, or seek to undercut the objections by 
showing that the arguments offered do not yield the conclusion. 
There is yet a third thing which believers can do and have done by way of 
taking objections seriously while yet resolved to persevere: They can take 
the objections as a stimulus to deeper reflection on the content of the faith. 
Sometimes when believers have done this they have come to the conclusion 
that the faith as received is compatible with what is true in the objection. At 
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other times they have responded by revising the content of the faith as re-
ceived, so that thus revised it is compatible with what is true in the objection. 
"OK. So there are various ways of taking objections seriously while yet 
resolving to persevere. But isn't there something wrong with the very reso-
lution? Or strictly, with the motive underlying the resolution? When all is 
said and done was there not some truth in Locke's suggestion that believing 
with a firmness not proportioned to the strength of the evidence must be due 
to some affection other than love of truth? Let it be conceded that Locke's 
way of putting his insight was not on target. Yet he was on to something: The 
resolution to persevere in the faith-or indeed in some philosophical system 
or anything else-has to be motivated by some affection other than love of 
truth. Yet when dealing with the question of whether to believe, only love of 
truth should enter the picture." 
Is the physicalist who is resolved to persevere in his physicalism motivated 
by something other than love of truth? Is the Christian believer who is re-
solved to hand on to the conviction that God has spoken to her motivated by 
something other than love of truth? Not necessarily, I would say. But often, 
Yes. Is that, though, necessarily wrong? 
A whole new topic of inquiry opens up before us. On this occasion we shall 
have to be content with glimpsing the vista. We have no time to enter it. 6 
Yale University 
NOTES 
1. To my knowledge, the finest theological articulation in the contemporary world of 
this understanding of faith is that by Gerhard Ebeling in The Nature of Faith (London: 
Wm. Collins & Co. Ltd., 1961). 
2. All quotations from John Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion will be from 
the translation by Ford Lewis Battles (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Pub!. Co., 1970). 
3. All quotations from John Locke's An Essay concerning the Human Understanding 
will be from the text in the edition by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). 
Here and there, however, I have changed spelling and capitalization. 
4. Suppose the principle had been couched in terms of firmness of belief instead of 
levels of confidence, and suppose it had been formulated affirmatively rather than nega-
tively, so that it read thus: For any proposition which comes within one's ken, one ought 
to believe it with a firmness proportioned to its probability on one's total evidence for it. 
(The qualifications attached to the principle formulated in the text should be understood 
as attached to this variant as well.) Suppose, then, that the probability of some proposition 
p on one's total evidence is .9; the principle instructs one then to believe p very firmly. 
Suppose one does that. By the complementational principle for negation (principle of 
additivity) in the Pascalian calculus, the probability of not-p is, in the situation envisaged, 
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.1. And so, according to this revised principle of proportionality, one ought to believe 
not-p very weakly. But of course one will not succeed in doing that; or if through some 
gross absent-mindedness one did, one shouldn't. One won't or shouldn't believe not-p 
weakly; one won't or shouldn't believe it at all. Thus a principle of proportionality 
formulated affirmatively and in terms of degrees of firmness of belief (or of degrees of 
certainty, or of degrees of credibility) is patently unacceptable. I'm not sure that Locke 
realized this. But in the text above I have, whenever there was a choice, adopted a 
charitable interpretation of what Locke had in mind and formulated his principle in terms 
of levels of confidence. (George Mavrodes points out the difficulties with the principle 
formulated above in his paper, to the best of my knowledge unpublished, MOn Proportion-
ing One's Belief to the Evidence.") 
5. Cf. later in the same section: ~Faith, then, as Paul teaches, serves as our shield. When 
held up against weapons it so receives their force that it either completely turns them aside 
or at least weakens their thrust, so that they cannot penetrate to our vitals. When, therefore, 
faith is shaken it is like a strong soldier forced by the violent blow of a spear to move his 
foot and to give ground a little. When faith itself is wounded it is as if the soldier's shield 
were broken at some point from the thrust of the spear, but not in such a manner as to be 
pierced. For the godly mind will always rise up so as to say with David, 'If I walk in the 
midst of the shadow of death, I shall fear no evils, for thou art with me.' Surely it is 
terrifying to walk in the darkness of death; and believers, whatever their strength may be, 
cannot but be frightened by it. But since the thought prevails that they have God beside 
them, caring for their safety, fear at once yields to assurance. However great are the 
devices, as Augustine says, that the devil throws up against us, while he holds no lodgment 
in the heart, where faith dwells, he is cast out. Thus, if we may judge from the outcome, 
believers not only emerge safely from every battle, so that, having received fresh strength, 
they are shortly after ready to descend again into the arena; but besides, what John says 
in his canonical letter is also fulfilled: 'This is the victory that overcomes the world, your 
faith. 'M 
6. I wish to thank my colleagues at Calvin College for their critique of an early draft of 
this paper. I have also been much benefitted in thinking through the issues here by reading 
an as-yet unpublished manuscript by Richard Foley titled Working without a Net. 
